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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 15-3503 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ANIELLO PALMIERI, 
   Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2-13-cr-00649-001) 
District Judge: Honorable William H. Walls  
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 7, 2017 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges.  
 
(Filed:  March 13, 2017) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Aniello Palmieri appeals his judgment of sentence following his conviction for 
mail fraud. Palmieri claims the District Court erred both in denying a downward 
departure and in applying a sentencing enhancement related to his status as a public 
official. We will affirm. 
I 
 As Director of the Division of Facilities Management for Union County, New 
Jersey, Palmieri assisted in selecting vendors for building materials, tools, and other 
supplies. At the time of his retirement, Palmieri’s salary exceeded $111,000, and he 
oversaw millions of dollars of purchases annually. From 2006 to 2010, Palmieri used his 
influence to participate in kickback schemes, verifying false and inflated invoices and 
receiving a portion of the vendors’ wrongful profit in return. 
 In 2010, Palmieri agreed to cooperate with law enforcement officials in their 
attempt to prosecute the participants in one of these schemes. Palmieri helped officials 
gather useful evidence for corruption prosecutions, including recording over 50 in-person 
conversations. 
 On October 2, 2013, Palmieri pleaded guilty to one count of mail fraud. At 
sentencing, the District Court found that Palmieri qualified for a four-level enhancement 
as a “public official in a high-level decision-making or sensitive position.” United States 
3 
 
Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) § 2C1.1(b)(3). Although the Government moved for a 
downward departure based on Palmieri’s substantial assistance under § 5K1.1 of the 
Guidelines, the Court denied the motion. In doing so, the Court expressed frustration with 
the “ridiculous” pattern of prosecutors requesting downward departures for “people who 
were corrupt in their public duty.” App. 31–32. Regarding Palmieri, the Court stated that 
his cooperation “does not impress this court,” particularly where “[t]he other persons 
were not in his level.” App. 36. The District Court sentenced Palmieri to 70 months’ 
imprisonment, the bottom of his Guidelines range. 
II1 
 Palmieri challenges both the District Court’s denial of a downward departure and 
its imposition of the public official enhancement. We see no merit in either challenge. 
A 
 As for Palmieri’s first challenge, we lack jurisdiction to review the discretionary 
denial of a motion for downward departure based on substantial assistance unless “the 
district court was not aware of or did not understand its discretion to make such a 
departure.” United States v. Grier, 585 F.3d 138, 141 (3d Cir. 2009). Here, the District 
Court—which referred to its “discretion” to grant or deny the motion, App. 29—was 
clearly aware of its power to grant Palmieri a downward departure.  
                                                 
 1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
 
4 
 
Palmieri insists we retain jurisdiction over whether the District Court gave “any 
meaningful analysis to the enumerated factors in [USSG § ]5K1.1.” Palmieri Br. 9. He 
relies primarily on United States v. Torres, which held a sentencing court considering a 
departure for substantial assistance “not only must conduct a qualitative, case-by-case 
analysis but also must examine § 5K1.1’s enumerated factors,” and found jurisdiction to 
review that examination for adequacy. 251 F.3d 138, 147 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 Even assuming that we have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s 
examination of these factors, the District Court met the standard set by Torres. We held in 
Torres that the district court “met its burden under § 5K1.1” where, despite not 
“articulat[ing] the details of Torres’s substantial assistance,” the court “heard and 
considered arguments that covered each factor enumerated in the Guidelines . . . indicated 
its awareness of Torres’s assistance in relation to the § 5K1.1 factors [and] balanced the 
seriousness of Torres’s offense against his substantial efforts to assist the government’s 
investigation.” 251 F.3d at 148–49. Here, the District Court: (1) heard argument relevant 
to the § 5K1.1 factors, App. 27–29; (2) acknowledged § 5K1.1 as the source of the 
Government’s position, App. 29; and (3) conducted an individualized assessment of 
Palmieri’s circumstances, including the significance of his assistance. App. 36, 48. While 
we express no opinion as to the merit of the concerns expressed by the District Court 
when reviewing Palmieri’s assistance, we note that “[p]olicy considerations are not off-
limits in sentencing” so long as a defendant is being assessed as an individual. United 
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States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 200 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the 
District Court acted within its discretion in denying the Government’s § 5K1.1 motion. 
B 
 Palmieri also challenges his four-level enhancement, arguing that he was not a 
“public official in a high-level decision-making or sensitive position” under the meaning 
of USSG § 2C1.1(b)(3). We review the District Court’s determination for clear error. 
United States v. Richards, 674 F.3d 215, 216 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 The application notes to § 2C1.1(b)(3) explain that a high-level decisionmaking or 
sensitive position is “characterized by a direct authority to make decisions for, or on 
behalf of, a government department, agency, or other government entity, or by a 
substantial influence over the decision-making process.” USSG § 2C1.1, app. n.4(A) 
(emphasis added); see also United States v. Savani, 733 F.3d 56, 62 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(“[G]uidelines commentary, interpreting or explaining the application of a guideline, is 
binding on us.”).  
 Palmieri has not shown how the District Court erred when it found he exercised 
substantial influence over the vendor selection process. Furthermore, he fails to 
distinguish our decision in Richards, where we upheld a § 2C1.2(b)(3) enhancement 
using an identical definition of “public official in a high-level decision-making or 
sensitive position.” While the official in Richards, like Palmieri, “could not act officially 
on the County’s behalf,” he exercised substantial influence through recommendations to 
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his superiors. 674 F.3d at 217; see also id. at 224.2 Therefore, the District Court did not 
clearly err when it enhanced Palmieri’s sentence pursuant to § 2C1.1(b)(3). 
* * * 
 We will affirm the District Court’s judgment for the reasons stated. 
                                                 
 2 Palmieri offers one out-of-circuit case, United States v. Stephenson, where the 
Second Circuit declined to apply his enhancement (then § 2C1.1(b)(2)) to an Export 
Licensing Officer who participated in a bribery scheme. 895 F.2d 867, 878 (2d Cir. 
1990). Stephenson is inapposite for three reasons. First, the court was engaged in de novo 
review, while we are reviewing the District Court’s determination only for clear error. Id. 
at 877–78. Second, the court primarily addressed the government’s theory that the 
defendant held a “sensitive” position, finding his discretion and security clearance did 
“not set him apart from a multitude of personnel in the federal service.” Id. at 878. 
Finally, a sentencing court could reasonably consider the defendant in Stephenson—
earning $40,000 a year as one of many Export Licensing Officers—as lower level than 
Palmieri, who was a county-wide director earning over six figures.  
